We characterize a rule in minimum cost spanning tree problems using an additivity property and some basic properties. If the set of possible agents has at least three agents, these basic properties are symmetry and separability. If the set of possible agents has two agents, we must add positivity.
Introduction
Imagine that a group of agents, located at different geographical places, want some particular service which can only be provided by a common supplier, called the source. Agents will be served through connections which entail some cost. However, they do not care whether they are connected directly or indirectly to the source. This situation is described by a symmetric matrix C, which specifies the connection costs between each pair agent-agent and agent-source. There are many situations that can be modeled in this way. For instance, several towns may draw power from a common power plant, and hence have to share the cost of the distribution network (Dutta and Kar, 2004 ). Lorenzo (2004, 2005 ) study a real situation where villagers had to pay the cost of constructing pipes from their respective houses to a water supplier. Other examples include communication networks, such as telephone, Internet, or cable television.
We assume that the agents construct a minimum cost spanning tree (mt). The question is how to divide the cost associated with the mt between the agents. A rule determines an allocation.
In this paper, we characterize a rule using a property of additivity. In its most natural formulation in mcstp, additivity is very demanding and no rule satisfies it. Hence, we introduce a restricted additivity. Other properties used in the characterization are symmetry, positivity, and separability. Symmetry says that symmetric agents must pay the same. Positivity says that every agent must pay at least zero.
Separability appears in Megiddo (1978) , Granot and Huberman (1981) , and Granot and Maschler (1998) with the name of decomposition, and in Bergantiños and VidalPuga (2007) with the name of separability. Two subsets of agents can connect to the source separately or jointly. If there are no savings when they connect jointly, separability says that the agents must pay the same in both circumstances.
Our results are the following. If the set of possible agents has at least three members, then there is a unique rule satisfying restricted additivity, symmetry, and separability. If the set of possible agents has exactly two members, then there is a unique rule satisfying positivity, restricted additivity, symmetry, and separability.
The rule we obtain in these characterizations is well known in the literature of mcstp. This rule was first introduced by Feltkamp, Tijs, and Muto (1994) and studied later by Brânzei, Moretti, Norde, and Tijs (2004) and Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2004 , 2006 .
Our paper is very related to the paper of Brânzei et al (2004) because they also characterize this rule using an additivity property and other two properties: equal treatment and upper bound contributions. These properties are very related to the concept of C-component. A C-component is a maximal coalition of agents that can be connected among themselves at zero cost. A rule satisfies equal treatment if all the members of a C-component receive the same. A rule satisfies upper bound contributions if the aggregate allocation assigned to the members of a C-component is not more than their connection cost to the source.
In Section 2 we introduce the model. In Section 3 we present our results.
Minimum cost spanning tree problems
Let N = {1, 2, ...} be the set of all possible agents. Given a finite set N ⊂ N , let Π N be the set of all permutations over N . Given π ∈ Π N , let π p denote the agent at position p ∈ {1, ..., |N |} in the order π.
We are interested in networks whose nodes are elements of a set N 0 = N ∪ {0}, where N ⊂ N is finite and 0 is a special node called the source.
A cost matrix C = (c ij ) i,j∈N 0 on N represents the cost of direct link between any pair of nodes. We assume that c ij = c ji ≥ 0 for each i, j ∈ N 0 and c ii = 0 for each i ∈ N 0 . Since c ij = c ji we work with undirected arcs, i.e. (i, j) = (j, i).
We denote the set of all cost matrices over N as C N .
A minimum cost spanning tree problem, briefly a mcstp, is a pair (N 0 , C) where N ⊂ N is a finite set of agents, 0 is the source, and C ∈ C N is the cost matrix. Given
The elements of g are called arcs. Given a network g and a pair of nodes i and j, a path from i to j in g is a sequence of different arcs
satisfying (i h−1 , i h ) ∈ g for all h ∈ {1, 2, ..., l}, i = i 0 , and j = i l . A tree is a network such that for all i ∈ N there is a unique path from i to the source. If t is a tree, we usually write t = {(i 0 , i)} i∈N where i 0 represents the first agent in the unique path in t from i to 0. Let G N denote the set of all networks over N 0 . Let G N 0 denote the set of all networks where every agent i ∈ N is connected to the source, i.e. there exists a path from i to 0 in the network.
Given a mcstp (N 0 , C) and g ∈ G N , we define the cost associated with g as
When there is no ambiguity, we write c (g) or c (C, g) instead of
A minimum cost spanning tree for (N 0 , C), briefly an mt, is a tree t over N 0 such that c (t) = min
It is well-known that an mt exists, even though it is not necessarily unique. Given a mcstp (N 0 , C), we denote the cost associated with any mt as m (N 0 , C).
A (cost allocation) rule is a function ψ that assigns to each mcstp
A coalitional game with transferable utility, briefly a T U game, is a pair (N, v)
In this paper we focus on a rule first introduced by Feltkamp et al (1994) , which we denote as ϕ. This rule can be defined as
where C * is the irreducible matrix. For all i, j ∈ N 0 , c * ij = max . This concept will be used in some of the proofs. Given a mcstp (N 0 , C) and S ⊂ N 0 , we say that i, j ∈ N 0 , i = j are (C, S)-connected if there exists a path g from i to j satisfying that g ∈ G S and c kl = 0 for all (k, l) ∈ g. We say that S ⊂ N 0 is a C-component if two conditions hold. First, for all i, j ∈ S, i and j are (C, S)-connected. Second, S is maximal, i.e. if S T there exist i, j ∈ T, i = j such that i and j are not (C, T )-connected.
Clearly, the set of C-components is a partition of N 0 .
The axiomatic characterization
In its most natural definition, we say that a rule ψ satisfies additivity if for all mcstp 
Hence, we should only claim additivity when the pair of problems are "similar", and not in any case. Moreover, we also want to claim additivity in a large subclass of problems.
In mcstp there exists an additivity property called cone-wise positive linearity (CP L) , which has been introduced by Brânzei et al (2004) . We say that ψ satis-
satisfying that there exists an order for the arcs σ :
such that if i, j, k, l ∈ N 0 with i < j, k < l, and σ (i, j) ≤ σ (k, l), then c ij ≤ c kl and c
Notice that according to this definition 1 two problems are "similar" when, ordering the arcs by their cost, we can obtain the same order in C and C ′ .
We now introduce our additivity property. If we want to claim
Let t be an mt in (N 0 , C + C ′ ). It is easy to see that t is an mt in both (N 0 , C) and (N 0 , C ′ ) . Assume that we order the arcs in t in non-decreasing cost. If we obtain the same order in (N 0 , C) and (N 0 , C ′ ) , then we claim additivity on these problems. This is our idea of "similar" problems. Formally, we say that ψ satisfies restricted additivity (RA) if
for all mcstp (N 0 , C) and (N 0 , C ′ ) satisfying that there exists an mt t = {(i
, and (N 0 , C + C ′ ) and an order π ∈ Π N such that c π 0
n πn and c
n πn . It is straightforward to check that RA implies CP L. We now introduce the "basic" properties we use in our characterization results. Given an mcstp (N 0 , C), we say that i, j ∈ N, i = j are symmetric if for all k ∈ N 0 \ {i, j}, c ik = c jk .
We say that ψ satisfies symmetry (SY M ) if for all mcstp (N 0 , C) and all pair of symmetric agents i, j ∈ N, ψ i (N 0 , C) = ψ j (N 0 , C).
We say that ψ satisfies positivity (P OS) if for all mcstp (N 0 , C) and all i ∈ N , ψ i (N 0 , C) ≥ 0.
We say that ψ satisfies separability (SEP ) if for all mcstp (N 0 , C) and Two subsets of the agents, S and N \ S, can connect to the source separately or can connect jointly. If there are no savings when they connect jointly, SEP says that agents must pay the same in both circumstances. Proposition 1. ϕ satisfies SEP , SY M , and RA.
Proof. In Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2007), we proved that ϕ satisfies SEP . On the other hand, ϕ is the Shapley value of an associated game. From this, it is straightforward to prove that ϕ satisfies SY M .
We now prove that ϕ satisfies RA. Let (N 0 , C) and (N 0 , C ′ ) be two mcstp and let
, and (N 0 , C + C ′ ) satisfying that there exists an order π ∈ Π N such that c π 0
kl } where g ij is the (unique) path in t connecting i and j. Hence, (C + C ′ )
Applying Proposition 2.3 in Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2007), it is not difficult to deduce that for all
. Thus, the result follows from the additivity of the Shapley value.
Assume that N has at least three agents. Then we have the following result: of cost matrices satisfying three conditions:
2. For each p ∈ {1, ..., a} there exist x p ∈ R and a network g p such that c
3. There exists σ :
such that if i, j, k, l ∈ N with i < j, k < l, and σ (i, j) ≤ σ (k, l), then c ij ≤ c kl and c Hence, it is enough to prove that ψ is unique on the subclass of mcstp (N 0 , C) satisfying that there exist x ∈ R and a network g such that c ij = x if (i, j) ∈ g and c ij = 0 otherwise. Assume that (N 0 , C) satisfies these conditions. Let { (N 1 ) 0 , N 2 , . .., N q } be the partition of N 0 in C-components. It is straight-
, ..., q} and i ∈ N r . Hence, we can assume that all the agents can be connected among themselves at zero cost. This implies that, given t = {(i 0 , i)} is an mt in (N 0 , C), there exists α ∈ N such that α 0 = 0 and c i 0 i = 0 for all i ∈ N \ {α}. We define C 1 and C 2 as follows:
It is not difficult to see that t is an mt in both (N 0 , C 1 ) and (N 0 , C 2 ). Moreover,
, and
Thus, it is enough to prove that ψ is unique on the subclass of mcstp (N 0 , C) where c ij = 0 if 0 / ∈ {i, j} and c 0i ∈ {0, x} for all i ∈ N . If c 0i = 0 for all i ∈ N , or c 0i = x for all i ∈ N, all the agents are symmetric. Under SY M , ψ i (N 0 , C) is 0 or x |N| for all i ∈ N. If there exist j, k ∈ N such that c 0j = x and c 0k = 0, we define N 1 = {i ∈ N | c 0i = x} ∪ {k} and N 2 = {i ∈ N | c 0i = 0} \ {k}. These sets are under the conditions of SEP and hence
is in the same case as before.
Thus, it is enough to prove that ψ is unique on the subclass of mcstp (N 0 , C) where there exists k ∈ N such that c 0i = x ∈ R if i = k and c ij = 0 otherwise.
Thus, it is enough to prove that for all i ∈ N \ {k}, ψ is unique in each problem (N 0 , C i ). Take i ∈ N \ {k} . It is trivial to see that
, and for
It only remains to prove that ψ is unique in the mcstp ({i, k} , C) where c 0k = c ik = 0 and c 0i = x.
Since m ({i, k} 0 , C) = 0, ψ ({i, k} 0 , C) = (y, −y) . We prove that y = 0. Let (N 0 , C ′ ) be such that N = {i, j, k}, c ′ 0i = x, and c ′ hl = 0 otherwise. We can find such a (N 0 , C ′ ) because N has at least three members.
The next theorem is a trivial consequence of Propositions 1 and 2.
Theorem 1.
If N has at least three agents, then ϕ is the unique rule satisfying SEP , SY M , and RA.
The properties used in Theorem 1 are independent. Assume N = {1, ..., n}. For each mcstp (N 0 , C) and i ∈ N we define ψ Let ψ 3 be defined as
for all i ∈ N , where Π ′ N is the subset of orders in which the agents with the cheapest cost to the source connect first, i.e. The next theorem is the analogous to Theorem 1 when N has two agents.
Theorem 2.
If N has two agents, then ϕ is the unique rule satisfying P OS, SEP , SY M , and RA.
Proof. In Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2007), we proved that ϕ satisfies P OS. By Proposition 1 we know that ϕ satisfies SEP , SY M, and RA.
We now prove the uniqueness. Let ψ be a rule satisfying P OS, SY M, SEP , and RA. If N = {i}, by definition ψ i (N 0 , C) = m (N 0 , C) = c 0i .
Assume that N = {i, j}. Using arguments similar to those used in the proof of Proposition 2, we can deduce that it is enough to prove that ψ is unique in the mcstp ({i, j} 0 , C) where c 0i = c ij = 0 and c 0j = x.
Since m (N 0 , C) = 0, ψ i (N 0 , C) = −ψ j (N 0 , C). Under P OS, ψ i (N 0 , C) = ψ j (N 0 , C) = 0.
The properties used in Theorem 2 are also independent. When N has two agents, ψ 1 satisfies SEP, RA and P OS but fails SY M; ψ 2 satisfies SY M, RA and P OS but fails SEP ; and ψ 3 satisfies SEP , SY M and P OS but fails RA.
Assume, without loss of generality, that N = {i, j} and c 0i ≤ c 0j . We consider the rule ψ 4 defined as In Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2007) we introduce, in mcstp, the property of Population Monotonicity (P M). We say that ψ satisfies P M if for all mcstp (N 0 , C), all S ⊂ N , and all i ∈ S, ψ i (N 0 , C) ≤ ψ i (S 0 , C). P M says that, if new agents join a society, no agent of the initial society can be worse off. Since P M implies SEP and ϕ satisfies P M , all the results of this paper hold with P M instead of SEP .
